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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/1073
DTSTAMP:20230914T125949Z
SUMMARY:Simple\, Credible\, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Santhoshini Velusamy (Harvard University\nCambridge\, 
 Massachusetts.)\n\nAbstract: \nAbstract:  We present a general framework
 \, applicable to both truthful and non-truthful auctions\, for designing a
 pproximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive auctions. 
 Given a (not necessarily truthful) single-item auction format satisfying c
 ertain technical conditions\, we run simultaneous item auctions augmented 
 with a personalized entry fee that each bidder must pay before accessing t
 he auction. The entry fee depends only on the prior distribution of bidder
  types\, and in particular\, is independent of the realized bids.\nWe boun
 d the revenue of the resulting two-part tariff mechanism using a novel geo
 metric lemma that enables us to provide revenue guarantees for many common
  non-truthful auctions that previously had none. Our framework can be used
  with many common auction formats\, such as simultaneous first-price\, sim
 ultaneous second-price\, and simultaneous all-pay auctions. For all-pay au
 ctions\, we prove that the resulting mechanism is also credible in the sen
 se that the auctioneer cannot benefit by deviating from the stated mechani
 sm after observing agent bids. This is the first static credible mechanism
  for multi-item additive auctions that guarantees a constant factor of the
  optimal revenue.\nA paper based on this joint work with Costis Daskalakis
 \, Maxwell Fishelson\, Brendan Lucier\, and Vasilis Syrgkanis was presente
 d at the Twenty-First ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2020
 ). The arXiv version of the paper is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/20
 02.06702\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/1073
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20200728T140000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20200728T150000
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