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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/1276
DTSTAMP:20230914T125957Z
SUMMARY:Fair and Efficient Allocations under Sub-additive Valuations
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Yeshwant Chandrakant  Pandit\n\nAbstract: \nFair divis
 ion of a set of resources among several agents is a commonly occurring pro
 blem in many real-world settings. In this paper\, we will study the proble
 m of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with sub-additive 
 valuations in a fair and efficient manner. Envy-Freeness up to any good (E
 FX) is the most compelling notion of fairness in the context of indivisibl
 e goods. Although the existence of EFX is not known beyond the simple case
  of two agents with sub-additive valuations \, some good approximations of
  EFX are known to exist\, namely 1/2-EFX allocation and EFX allocations wi
 th bounded charity.\n\nIn this talk\, we will look at a polynomial time al
 gorithm that outputs an allocation that satisfies either of the two approx
 imations of EFX as well as achieve an O(n) approximation to the Nash welfa
 re\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/1276
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230224T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230224T170000
LOCATION:A201
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