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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/1495
DTSTAMP:20241118T113152Z
SUMMARY:Minimizing Rosenthal's Potential in Monotone Congestion Games
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Christos Tsoufis (Université Paris Dauphine)\n\nAbstr
 act: \nCongestion games are attractive because they can model many concret
 e situations where some competing entities interact through the use of som
 e shared resources\, and also because they always admit pure Nash equilibr
 ia which correspond to the local minima of a potential function. We explor
 e the problem of computing a state of minimum potential in this setting. U
 sing the maximum number of resources that a player can use at a time\, and
  the possible symmetry in the players' strategy spaces\, we settle the com
 plexity of the problem for instances having monotone (i.e.\, either non-de
 creasing or non-increasing) latency functions on their resources. The pict
 ure\, delineating polynomial and NP-hard cases is complemented with tight 
 approximation algorithms.\n \nShort Bio:\nChristos Tsoufis is a 2nd year 
 Ph.D. researcher in Computer Science at Université Paris Dauphine - PSL\,
  specializing in algorithmic game theory\, combinatorial optimization\, an
 d theoretical machine learning\, under the supervision of CNRS Researchers
  Angelo Fanelli and Laurent Gourvès. His research explores computational 
 approaches to approximate stable outcomes in games and multi-agent systems
 . Christos holds an integrated Master’s degree in Electrical and Compute
 r Engineering from the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA)\, wh
 ere he graduated with high honours.\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/1495
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241122T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241122T170000
LOCATION:via Zoom in A201
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