BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//eluceo/ical//2.0/EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/1593
DTSTAMP:20250717T105949Z
SUMMARY:Six Candidates Suffice to Win a Voter Majority
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Vivek Karunakaran (TIFR)\n\nAbstract: \nA cornerstone 
 of social choice theory is Condorcet's paradox which says that in an elect
 ion where n voters rank m candidates it is possible that\, no matter which
  candidate is declared the winner\, a majority of voters would have prefer
 red an alternative candidate. Instead\, can we always choose a small commi
 ttee of winning candidates that is preferred to any alternative candidate 
 by a majority of voters?Elkind\, Lang\, and Saffidine raised this question
  and called such a committee a Condorcet winning set. They showed that win
 ning sets of size 2 may not exist\, but sets of size logarithmic in the nu
 mber of candidates always do. In this work\, the authors show that Condorc
 et winning sets of size 6 always exist\, regardless of the number of candi
 dates or the number of voters. The proof uses the probabilistic method and
  the minimax theorem\, inspired by recent work on approximately stable com
 mittee selection.\nAuthors: Moses Charikar\, Alexandra Lassota\, Prasann
 a Ramakrishnan\, Adrian Vetta\, Kangning Wang\n[2411.03390] Six Candidat
 es Suffice to Win a Voter Majority\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/1593
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250723T140000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250723T153000
LOCATION:A-201 (STCS Seminar Room)
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR