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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/1609
DTSTAMP:20250826T072015Z
SUMMARY:Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Mixed Manna
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Aditi Sethia (IISc Bangalore)\n\nAbstract: \nIn this t
 alk\, we will discuss fair division of indivisible mixed manna (items whos
 e values may be positive\, negative\, or zero) among agents with additive 
 preferences. In such settings\, the existence of fair (approximate envy-fr
 ee) and efficient allocations is an intriguing open question even for thre
 e agents. We will see how fairness --- in terms of a new relaxation of env
 y-freeness --- and efficiency can always be achieved together. Specificall
 y\, our fairness guarantees are in terms of envy-freeness up to k realloca
 tions (EFR-k): An allocation A is said to be EFR-k if there exists a subse
 t R of at most k items such that\, for each agent i\, we can reassign item
 s from within R and obtain an allocation which is envy-free for i.Our resu
 lts advance the understanding of fair and efficient allocation of indivisi
 ble mixed manna and rely on a novel application of the Knaster-Kuratowski-
 Mazurkiewicz (KKM) Theorem in discrete fair division. We utilize weighted 
 welfare maximization\, with perturbed valuations\, to achieve Pareto effic
 iency\, and overall\, our techniques are notably different from existing m
 arket-based approaches.Short Bio: Aditi is currently a Post-Doctoral Fello
 w at the Indian Institute of Science\, Bangalore\, hosted by Prof. Siddhar
 th Barman. She received her PhD from IIT Gandhinagar\, advised by Prof. Ne
 eldhara Misra. Her research interests revolve around Computational Social 
 Choice (Fair Division\, Voting and Matching problems)\, Algorithmic Game T
 heory\, and Economics and Computation.\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/1609
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250903T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250903T170000
LOCATION:A-201 (STCS Seminar Room)
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