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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/1652
DTSTAMP:20251204T101911Z
SUMMARY:Finding equilibria: easier for optimists\, easiest for pessimists
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Léonard Brice (Université libre de Bruxelles and IST
  Austria)\n\nAbstract: \n\nIn multiplayer games played on graphs\, as soon
  as randomness is involved (because the game is stochastic or because the 
 players are allowed to randomise their strategies)\, deciding the existenc
 e of a Nash equilibrium that satisfies a given constraint\, for example su
 ch that the players' payoffs lie in specified intervals\, is undecidable i
 n all reasonable settings. However\, these results rely on a definition of
  Nash equilibria that implies that each player intends to maximise their e
 xpected payoff\, which is not always the most rational behaviour: their to
 lerance to risk may vary. In this talk\, we consider the pessimistic risk 
 measure\, which interprets randomness by considering the worst possible sc
 enario\, and its dual\, the optimistic risk measure. We define from those 
 notions a new notion of equilibrium\, the extreme risk-sensitive equilibri
 um\, and show that the constrained existence problem of such an equilibriu
 m is decidable.\nShort Bio:Léonard Brice recently completed a PhD in theo
 retical computer science in the Free university of Brussels\, and is now s
 tarting a post-doc at the Institute of Science and Technology Austria\, wi
 th Thomas Henzinger. His research focuses on multiplayer games\, in partic
 ular games played on graphs\, toward applications to multi-agent systems.\
 n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/1652
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251205T110000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251205T120000
LOCATION:A-201 (STCS Seminar Room)
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