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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/1737
DTSTAMP:20260629T114552Z
SUMMARY:On the Existence of Fair and Stable Data Exchanges
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury\n\nAbstract: \n  Across many bi
 llion-dollar industries\, organizations pool proprietary data for mutual b
 enefit without selling it. A striking feature of these arrangements is tha
 t participation is rarely open: access is gated on contribution\, e.g.\, c
 redit bureaus codify this as explicit "Principles of Reciprocity" — a su
 bscriber receives the level of data it contributes and is expected to cont
 ribute all it has\; fraud consortia describe themselves as "give-to-get". 
 This motivates reciprocity as a first-class design goal: each participan
 t should receive value from the exchange at least equal to the value its o
 wn data contributes to others\, where contributions are measured by a stan
 dard credit-sharing rule such as the Shapley value. Reciprocity alone\, ho
 wever\, is vacuous: the empty exchange in which no one shares anything is 
 trivially reciprocal\, yet useless. We therefore need a guarantee that the
  exchange is also efficient — that participants do not leave mutually be
 neficial trades on the table. We capture this through stability: no group
  of participants should be able to break away and arrange a private exchan
 ge among themselves that every member strictly prefers. Stability\, too\, 
 is trivial in isolation — the exchange in which everyone shares everythi
 ng is perfectly stable\, since no breakaway group can do better — but it
  is generally not reciprocal. The two requirements thus pull in opposite d
 irections and satisfying them together is far from obvious. Our main resul
 t shows that it is always possible: a data exchange that is simultaneously
  reciprocal and stable exists for an extremely broad class of participant 
 utilities (any monotone\, continuous valuation of received data) and for a
 ny credit-sharing rule meeting mild\, standard conditions —  thereby\, 
 covering several settings in which such exchanges arise in practice.\n Bi
 o: Assistant Professor in the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Syst
 ems Engineering\, with an affiliate appointment in the Siebel School of Co
 mputing and Data Science at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (U
 IUC). He leads the IDEAL Lab (Incentives\, Data\, Equilibria\, Allocations
 \, and Learning). His research lies at the intersection of economics and c
 omputation\, machine learning\, and theoretical computer science\, with a 
 focus on data economics\, equilibrium computation\, mechanism design\, and
  fair allocation.\n---\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/1737
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260717T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260717T170000
LOCATION:A-201 (STCS Seminar Room)
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