The central goal of secure multiparty computation (MPC) is to design a communication protocol for $n$ parties $P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n$, where $P_i$ holds private input $x_i$, to jointly compute a distributed functionality $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$. Further, we require that each party learns nothing about the private inputs of the other parties (beyond what is revealed by the output of the functionality). 

We will see the working of the IPS protocol compiler, which allows us to build MPC protocols that remain secure when a dishonest majority of the parties are corrupted, from component protocols that satisfy weaker security guarantees. The IPS paradigm is of particular interest in the design of black-box MPC protocols from minimal cryptographic assumptions. 

This talk is based on the paper "Founding Cryptography on Oblivious Transfer – Efficiently" by Yuval Ishai, Manoj Prabhakaran and Amit Sahai.