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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/1799
DTSTAMP:20261110T064530Z
SUMMARY:Truthful Budget Aggregation
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Dr. Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin (TU Eindhoven)\n\nAbstrac
 t: \nWe study budget aggregation\, in which voters report their ideal dist
 ribution of a budget across a set of alternatives\, and a mechanism aggreg
 ates these reports into an allocation. A central goal is truthfulness: vot
 ers should have no incentive to misreport their preferences. For this sett
 ing\, the literature has identified a class of mechanisms called moving-ph
 antom mechanisms\, which are truthful and satisfy three basic desiderata: 
 anonymity\, neutrality\, and continuity. This talk addresses three results
  in this setting.\n(I) For two alternatives\, moving-phantom mechanisms ar
 e precisely the mechanisms satisfying all four properties mentioned above.
  Whether additional mechanisms exist for more alternatives has been a recu
 rring open question. We answer this question affirmatively by presenting a
  class of truthful\, anonymous\, neutral\, and continuous mechanisms that 
 are not moving-phantom mechanisms.\n(II) The breadth of the moving-phantom
  class makes choosing among its members nontrivial. Surprisingly\, we show
  that most moving-phantom mechanisms can nevertheless be linearly ordered 
 by their social welfare guarantees.\n(III) Moving-phantom mechanisms have 
 been shown to offer limited fairness guarantees. We show that these limita
 tions extend to truthful mechanisms more generally and present a non-truth
 ful mechanism satisfying strong proportionality properties.\nThis is joint
  work with Mark de Berg\, Javier Cembrano\, Rupert Freeman\, and Markus Ut
 ke.\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/1799
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20261119T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20261119T170000
LOCATION:A-201 (STCS Seminar Room)
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