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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/205
DTSTAMP:20230914T125914Z
SUMMARY:The Concert Queueing Game with a Finite Homogeneous Population
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Sandeep K. Juneja\nTata Institute of Fundamental Resea
 rch\nSchool of Technology and Computer Science\nHomi Bhabha Roa\n\nAbstrac
 t: \nWe consider the non-cooperative choice of arrival times by individual
  users\, or customers\, to a service system that opens at a given time\, a
 nd where users queue up and are served in order of arrival. Each user wish
 es to obtain service as early as possible\, while minimizing the expected 
 wait in the queue. This problem was recently studied within a simplified f
 luid model. Here we address the non-asymptotic stochastic system\, assumin
 g a finite (possibly random) number of homogeneous users\, exponential ser
 vice times\, and linear cost functions. In this setting we show that there
  exists a unique Nash equilibrium\, which is symmetric across users\, and 
 characterize the equilibrium arrival-time distribution of each user in ter
 ms of a corresponding set of differential equations. We further establish 
 convergence of the Nash equilibrium solution to that of the associated flu
 id model as the number of users increases to infinity. We also show that t
 he price of anarchy in our system exceeds 2\, but approaches this value fo
 r a large population size.\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/205
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20110704
LOCATION:A-212 (STCS Seminar Room)
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