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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/348
DTSTAMP:20230914T125920Z
SUMMARY:On the Manipulablilty of Elections on Average
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Girish Varma\n\nAbstract: \nElections are a way of agg
regating preferences made by individual voters and making a choice for the
whole. Questions about how to make such a "social choice"\, or whether su
ch a choice can be made have been well studied under the topic of social c
hoice theory. One of the staggering conclusions(known as the Arrows Imp
osibility theorem) derived very early was that\, if we assume certain sim
ple assumptions about elections\, then the only way of making the social c
hoice is a dictatorship. In this lecture\, we will see a quantitative ver
sion of a similar theorem(Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem). That is\, for
a random voting profile\, with non trivial probability an assumption about
manipulability of the election is violated if the election is very diff
erent from a dictatorship.\n\nFor the super interested\, we will be cover
ing the paper "The Geometry of Manipulation - a Quantitative Proof of the
Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem" by Isaksson\, Mossel and Kindler. The pro
of is purely geometric\, combinatorial and does not use discrete harmonic
analysis.\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/348
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130315T143000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130315T160000
LOCATION:A-212 (STCS Seminar Room)
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