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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/387
DTSTAMP:20230914T125922Z
SUMMARY:Unbalanced Random Matching Markets
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Yashodhan Kanoria (Columbia University\nDecision\, Ris
 k and Operations Division\nNew York\, NY\nUnited States of America)\n\nAbs
 tract: \nWe analyze large random matching markets with unequal numbers of 
 men and women. We find that being on the short side of the market confers 
 a large advantage. For each agent\, assign a rank of 1 to the agent's most
  preferred partner\, a rank of 2 to the next most preferred partner and so
  forth. If there are $n$ men and $n + 1$ women then\, we show that with hi
 gh probability\, in any stable matching\, the men's average rank of their 
 wives is no more than $3 log n$\, whereas the women's average rank of thei
 r husbands is at least $n/(3 log n)$. Furthermore\, with high probability\
 , the fraction of agents with multiple stable partners is vanishing as the
  market grows large\, i.e.\, such unbalanced random matching markets have 
 a 'small core'.\nOur results suggest that a 'small core' may be generic in
  matching markets\, contrary to prior beliefs (based on joint work with It
 ai Ashlagi and Jacob Leshno).\nBio: Yashodhan Kanoria is Assistant Profess
 or in the Decision\, Risk and Operations Division at Columbia Business Sch
 ool. He obtained a B. Tech. from IIT Bombay and a PhD from Stanford\, both
  in Electrical Engineering. His current research interests include matchin
 g markets\, graphical models and probability.\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/387
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130724T143000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130724T153000
LOCATION:A-212 (STCS Seminar Room)
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