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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/482
DTSTAMP:20230914T125926Z
SUMMARY:Social Algorithms and Internet Economics
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Swaprava Nath (Indian Statistical Institute\nEconomics
  and Planning Unit\n7\, S.J.S. Sansanwat Marg\nNew Delhi 110016)\n\nAbstra
 ct: \nAbstract: Classical algorithm design assumes that all the parameters
  of the objective function is known. When that information is held private
 ly by multiple agents\, we arrive in the domain of mechanism design\, wher
 e the parameters of a social objective function is dispersed among the str
 ategic agents who reveal this information when an algorithm can be designe
 d to incentivize them to do so. In the first part of the talk\, I will mot
 ivate the design of algorithm under incomplete information. In the latter 
 part\, I will discuss our recent result in the domain of quasi-linear pref
 erences with selfish valuations\, a domain that is relevant for resource s
 haring applications like mobile bandwidth or cloud computing. We show that
  even though the valuations are less rich than that in the requirements of
  Roberts (1979)\, we are able to get the affine maximizer result with an a
 dditional assumption on the social choice function and the allocation spac
 e.\n\nThe later part of the talk is based on my recent work: https://dl.dr
 opboxusercontent.com/u/26115762/site/publications.html#nath-sen14roberts\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/482
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140418T143000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140418T153000
LOCATION:AG-80
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