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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/496
DTSTAMP:20230914T125926Z
SUMMARY:The Analysis and Design of Network Congestion Games
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Umang Bhaskar (California Institute of Technology\n120
 0 E. California Blvd.\nPasadena\, CA 91125\nUnited States of America)\n\nA
 bstract: \nAbstract: In many applications\, users strategically choose pat
 hs in a network to minimize the congestion they face. Examples of such app
 lications are road traffic\, data networks\, and machine scheduling. Netwo
 rk congestion games model this strategic behaviour of the users\, and are 
 used to understand and predict the impact of this behaviour on congestion 
 in the network.\nIn this talk\, I first introduce network congestion games
  and present results for fundamental properties of these games. I then con
 sider a natural design problem: to increment capacity in the network under
  a fixed budget\, so that the average congestion for the strategic users i
 s minimized. This problem is widely studied in transportation research. De
 spite this\, there are very few guarantees for polynomial-time algorithms.
  I will present both algorithms and hardness results for this network impr
 ovement problem in different network topologies\, and describe a number of
  related problems as directions for future research.\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/496
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140605T120000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140605T130000
LOCATION:AG-80
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