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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/609
DTSTAMP:20230914T125931Z
SUMMARY:Managing Congestion in Dynamic Matching Markets
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Yashodhan Kanoria (Columbia University\nDecision\, Ris
 k and Operations Division\nNew York\, NY\nUnited States of America)\n\nAbs
 tract: \nAbstract: We consider a decentralized two-sided matching market i
 n which agents arrive and depart asynchronously. As a result\, it is possi
 ble that an agent on one side of the market (a “buyer”) identifies an 
 agent on the other side of the market (a “seller”) who is a suitable m
 atch\, only to find that the seller is already matched. We find using a me
 an field approach that lack of knowledge about availability can create lar
 ge welfare losses to both buyers and sellers. We consider a simple interve
 ntion available to the platform: limiting visibility of sellers. We find t
 hat this intervention can significantly improve the welfare of agents on b
 oth sides of the market\; sellers pay lower application costs\, while buye
 rs are less likely to find that the sellers they screen have already match
 ed. Somewhat counterintuitively\, the benefits of showing fewer sellers to
  each buyer are greatest in markets in which there is a shortage of seller
 s (joint work with Nick Arnosti and Ramesh Johari).\n\n \n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/609
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150720T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150720T170000
LOCATION:AG-80
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