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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/832
DTSTAMP:20230914T125940Z
SUMMARY:Voting on Restricted Preference Domains: A Survey
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Edith Elkind (Balliol College \nUniversity of Oxford \
 nDepartment of Computer Science \nRoom 413\, Wolfson Building \nParks Road
 \, Oxford OX1 3QD \nUnited Kingdom)\n\nAbstract: \nArrow's famous impossib
 ility theorem (1951) states that there is no perfect voting rule: for thre
 e or more candidates\, no voting rule can satisfy a small set of very appe
 aling axioms. However\, this is no longer the case if we assume that voter
 s' preferences satisfy certain restrictions\, such as being single-peaked 
 or single-crossing. In this talk\, we discuss single-peaked and single-cro
 ssing elections\, as well as some other closely related restricted prefere
 nce domains\, and provide an overview of recent algorithmic results for th
 ese domains.\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/832
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20171211T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20171211T110000
LOCATION:A-201 (STCS Seminar Room)
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