# Routing Games between Selfish Users

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## Motivation





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#### Motivation





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• What's the best way from point *a* to point *b*?

## Networks



# Networks



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• Directed graph

#### Networks



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- Directed graph
- Source *s*, destination *t*

## Flows



#### Flows



• Conservation: Flow in = flow out except s and t

#### Flows



- Conservation: Flow in = flow out except s and t
- "Value" of flow

## The Problem of Routing



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### The Problem of Routing



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• Delay function: f(x), where x is total flow on edge

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- Delay function: f(x), where x is total flow on edge
- Delay to player p = p's flow on edge  $\times$  delay of edge

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- Delay function: f(x), where x is total flow on edge
- Delay to player p = p's flow on edge  $\times$  delay of edge
- Total delay =  $3 \times 4 + 3 \times 6 = 30$





• Total delay =  $5 \times 4 + 1 \times 2 = 22$ 



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- Total delay =  $5 \times 4 + 1 \times 2 = 22$
- Properties of delay functions





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• Delay to player p = p's flow on edge  $\times$  delay of edge



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• Delay to red player  $= 4 \times 6 = 24$ 



• Delay to player p = p's flow on edge  $\times$  delay of edge

- Delay to red player  $= 4 \times 6 = 24$
- Delay to blue player  $= 6 \times 6 = 36$



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• Delay to red player =  $3 \times 6 + 1 \times 4 = 22$  (earlier 24)

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- Delay to red player  $= 3 \times 6 + 1 \times 4 = 22$  (earlier 24)
- Delay to blue player  $= 5 \times 6 + 1 \times 4 = 34$  (earlier 36)



- Delay to red player  $= 3 \times 6 + 1 \times 4 = 22$  (earlier 24)
- Delay to blue player  $= 5 \times 6 + 1 \times 4 = 34$  (earlier 36)
- Neither player can reduce delay by changing its flow



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• Delay to blue player  $= 4 \times 6 + 2 \times 6 = 36$ 



• Delay for red player = 22, delay for blue player = 34

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• Delay for red player = 22, delay for blue player = 34

• No user can reduce delay by changing its flow



• Delay for red player = 22, delay for blue player = 34

- No user can reduce delay by changing its flow
- The flow is in "equilibrium"



• A flow is in "equilibrium" if no user can reduce its delay by changing its own flow


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• Equilibrium represents "stability"

• Does equilibrium always exist?

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  - If delay functions are semi-convex, yes! [Orda et al. 1993]

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• Is equilibrium unique?

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- Is equilibrium unique?
  - Depends...

Question: Is equilibrium unique?

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• Large number of users, each controlling infinitesimal amount of flow, equilibrium is unique [Beckmann et al. 1956]

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In our work,

- show that equilibrium may not be unique,
- give a complete characterization of graph topologies with a unique equilibrium

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- Give a complete characterization of topologies with unique equilibria. In particular,
  - For 2 players, equilibrium is unique if and only if the network is *generalized series-parallel*

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Players are of the same type if they have the same flow value



Two players of the same type



Four players, two types

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  - For 2 players, equilibrium is unique if and only if the network is *generalized series-parallel*
  - For more than 2 players, of only 2 *types*, equilibrium is unique if and only if the network is *series-parallel*
  - For players of more than 2 types, equilibrium is unique if and only if the network is *generalized nearly-parallel*

Defined inductively:

• Base case: a single edge is a series-parallel graph



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- Inductive step: Join two series-parallel graphs,
- either in *series*,



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Defined inductively:

- Base case: a single edge is a series-parallel graph
- Inductive step: Join two series-parallel graphs,
- either in series,

• or in parallel



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A series-parallel graph



A series-parallel graph



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A series-parallel graph



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A series-parallel graph



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A series-parallel graph



• *Generalized series-parallel graphs* are a slightly bigger class of graphs.



A non-series-parallel graph

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• This is the smallest non-generalized series-parallel graph

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• 2 players, series-parallel graph  $\Rightarrow$  unique equilibrium

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- 2 players, series-parallel graph  $\Rightarrow$  unique equilibrium
- Key idea: properties arising from difference of flows

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#### The Difference of Two Flows



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## The Difference of Two Flows

 $\rightarrow$  : sum of  $\rightarrow$  and  $\rightarrow$ 





#### The Difference of Two Flows

 $\rightarrow$  : sum of  $\rightarrow$  and  $\rightarrow$ 



 $\rightarrow$  : sum of  $\rightarrow$  and  $\rightarrow$ 



The difference of flows, f - f'

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The difference of flows, f - f'

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A red agreeing cycle





The difference of flows, f - f'



A red agreeing cycle



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 $\rightarrow$  : sum of  $\rightarrow$  and  $\rightarrow$ 



A red agreeing cycle



A blue agreeing cycle

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Not an agreeing cycle



A red agreeing cycle A blue agreeing cycle

A cycle C is a *p*-agreeing cycle if on every edge of cycle C, the direction of the total change in flow is the same as the direction of change in flow for player p.

We show the following results in our paper:

• If f and f' are equilibrium flows, then the flow difference

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f - f' cannot contain an agreeing cycle

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• For 2 players on generalized series-parallel graphs, the difference in two flows must contain an agreeing cyle

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- If f and f' are equilibrium flows, then the flow difference f f' cannot contain an agreeing cycle
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- Hence, for 2 players on generalized series-parallel graphs, there must be a unique equilibrium

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- If f and f' are equilibrium flows, then the flow difference f f' cannot contain an agreeing cycle
- For 2 players on generalized series-parallel graphs, the difference in two flows must contain an agreeing cyle
- Hence, for 2 players on generalized series-parallel graphs, there must be a unique equilibrium
- We explicitly construct an example of multiple equilibria on a non-generalized series-parallel graph for 2 players

# Multiple Equilibria on a Non-generalized series-parallel Graph



A non-generalized series-parallel graph

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## Multiple Equilibria on a Non-generalized series-parallel Graph



Flow difference on the graph

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# Multiple Equilibria on a Non-generalized series-parallel Graph



Red player does not have an agreeing cycle

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## Multiple Equilibria on a Non-series-parallel Graph



Blue player does not have an agreeing cycle

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## Multiple Equilibria on a Non-series-parallel Graph

• No agreeing cycles in the given flow difference

## Multiple Equilibria on a Non-series-parallel Graph

- No agreeing cycles in the given flow difference
- We use this as basis to construct example of multiple equilibria in paper

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• Difference of two equilibrium flows cannot contain agreeing cycle

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- Difference of two equilibrium flows cannot contain agreeing cycle
- For 2 players on generalized series-parallel graphs, difference of two flows contains agreeing cycles; hence equilibrium unique

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• For more than 2 types of players on nearly-parallel graphs, difference of two flows contains agreeing cycles; hence equilibrium unique

- Difference of two equilibrium flows cannot contain agreeing cycle
- For 2 players on generalized series-parallel graphs, difference of two flows contains agreeing cycles; hence equilibrium unique

- For more than 2 types of players on nearly-parallel graphs, difference of two flows contains agreeing cycles; hence equilibrium unique
- Give examples of multiple equilibria on non-generalized series-parallel graphs and non-nearly-parallel graphs

# Questions?