Computational Social Choice
Course outline
Social choice studies how groups of agents aggregate their preferences to reach a collective decision. In this course, we are interested in both computational and analytical aspects of this decision making. We plan to cover classical and recent results in computational social choice, particularly in fair division, voting, and matching. Course participants will be required to present papers, chosen in consultation with me.
Prerequisites
The course will require elements of algorithms, linear and nonlinear programming, and algorithmic game theory.
Details
Classes will be held Tue / Thu 11:30-1 pm in A-201.

Classes begin on January 31st.

Reference material
The lectures will mostly consist of material from recent papers. However the following references may be useful:

Lectures
Feb 2nd: Lecture Notes
A combinatorial algorithm for computing equilibria in Fisher's market with additive valuations (note that this is actually the second lecture, we don't have notes for the first lecture).

References: Chapter 5 in the AGT book.

Assignments